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In this paper, we investigate the gap between the ￿rst target of the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) and the actual allocation of grant aid in the late-1990s and the early-2000s in
order to identify necessary policy adjustments to achieve the goal. As a theoretical frame-
work, we extend the poverty-targeting model of Besley and Kanbur (1988) by considering
multiple donors and possible strategic interactions among them. To test theoretical predic-
tions, we employ detailed data on grant aid allocation of eleven major aid donor countries
and on aid disbursement of six international institutions including the IBRD, IDA, and UN
organizations. Four main empirical results emerged. First, both in the late-1990s and the
early-2000s, grant allocations from Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, and UK are
consistent with the necessary conditions of optimal poverty targeting. Second, we found
that there is a negative population scale e⁄ect for aid allocation, suggesting that strategic
motives may also exist. Third, the overall results for multilateral donors indicate that allo-
cation patterns are consistent with the theory of poverty targeting. Finally, there has been
a recent improvement in coordination among major donors in reducing global poverty.
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 1 Introduction
Since the mid-1990s, the international community￿ s development objectives have converged on
poverty reduction. Current policy statements of multilateral institutions and aid donor countries
are stressing explicitly the importance of poverty reduction at the global level. For instance,
the ￿rst goal of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is to eradicate extreme poverty
and hunger in the world by the year 2015. The numerical criteria to achieve this goal are the
proportion of global population living on below one dollar per day and the corresponding poverty
gap ratio.
In this paper, we investigate the gap between the ￿rst goal of the MDGs and the actual aid
allocation in the late-1990s and the early-2000s, in order to obtain insights on necessary policy
changes to achieve the MDGs. To this aim, we construct a theoretical framework of global
poverty reduction, which formalizes the ￿rst goal of the MDGs. Then, by employing cross-
country data, we extend Besley and Kanbur￿ s (1988) model of targeting of food subsidies to the
international aid provisions.1 We explicitly evaluate whether donors￿aid allocations are designed
to reduce poverty by comparing quantitatively the global poverty reduction e⁄ect of international
aid provided by eleven donor countries (France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, UK, US,
Canada, Italy, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) and six international institutions including the
World Bank and United Nations organizations.
The aims and approach of our study may be seen as comparable to those of Collier and
Dollar (2002) who derive a poverty-e¢ cient allocation of aid and compare it with the actual
aid allocations and Baulch (2006) who examines whether the major donors distribute their aid
in accordance with the MDGs. Yet, four features di⁄erentiate our study from theirs. First,
unlike Collier and Dollar (2002) and Baulch (2006), we model and incorporate recipients￿policy
responses in the estimation. We believe that this is a critical distinction especially because the
existing in￿ uential studies such as Burnside and Dollar (2000) found the importance of recipients￿
governance in aid e⁄ectiveness. Second, we incorporate possibilities of strategic aid allocation
motives explicitly, which were not considered in their studies. Third, while we utilize cross-
country comparable poverty indicators directly, Collier and Dollar (2002) selected particular
values for poverty reduction elasticity of income based on existing studies. A major drawback of
1This application was adopted ￿rst by Sawada (1996).
1Collier and Dollar (2002) is that their ￿nal results are sensitive to a choice of the elasticity and an
assumption of common elasticity across countries, which has never been tested. In contrast, we
impose no restrictions on the elasticity of poverty reduction. Finally, unlike the existing studies,
our estimation covers two periods: 1996-1999 and 2001-2004. This enables us to evaluate recent
changes that occurred after the initiation of the MDGs in 2000.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we brie￿ y review the
existing literature on foreign aid. Section 3 presents a theoretical model of aid allocation to
guide econometric modeling. In Section 4, empirical strategies and data are described. In
Section 5, the empirical results are reported and discussed. The ￿nal section summarizes the
paper with concluding remarks.
2 Existing Studies on Foreign Aid
The existing studies on international aid can be divided into three groups, according to their
focus on donors, recipients, or both. First, several researchers have examined the motivations
and determinants of donors￿aid allocation. There is substantial controversy over the motivation
behind aid provisions. Other than poverty reduction, aid donor countries may be concerned
with such issues as mutual bene￿ts, potential economic and political bene￿ts for themselves, and
international security. Empirical results, however, are mixed. On one hand, a welfare function
estimated by Behrman and Sah (1984) suggests that donors as a whole have signi￿cant inequality
aversion in the international distribution of aid. Based on statistical tests of a rigorous theoretical
model of ODA, Trumbull and Wall (1994) found that foreign aid allocations are determined by
the recipient country￿ s needs represented by infant mortality and political-civil rights. On the
other hand, according to recent studies, donor countries largely seem to be motivated by strategic
considerations, rather than the altruism or real needs of the receiving countries [e.g., Alesina
and Dollar (2000)], con￿rming ￿ndings by Maizels and Nissanke (1984). Collier and Dollar
(2002) also support this view, ￿nding that actual aid allocation is far from e¢ cient in terms
of poverty reduction. Moreover, Alesina and Weder (2002) document that there is no evidence
that donors allocate more aid to less corrupt governments. Strategic allocation of aid may be an
outcome of donors￿domestic political situations. Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller (2000) argues
that lobbying by ethnic groups in the donor country enhances aid provisions to its country
2of origin. In contrast, motivation for multilateral aid can be more transparent. Multilateral
agencies are largely apolitical and more exclusively concerned with development and/or poverty
reduction [Burnside and Dollar (2000); Cassen et al. (1994); Maizels and Nissanke (1984);
Frey and Schneider (1986); Sawada (1996)]. With aims similar to ours, Baulch (2006) and
Kasuga (2007) examine whether major donors distribute their aid in accordance with the MDG
targets, including the non-monetary ones. Estimating aid concentration curves for monetary
poverty, child malnutrition, school enrollment, and under-￿ve mortality, Baulch (2006) shows
clear contrasts between progressivity and regressivity depending on donors.
Second, there are studies on the policy response of recipients to aid provisions [Boone (1996);
Burnside and Dollar (2000); Collier and Dollar (2002); World Bank (1998)]. For example,
an in￿ uential study by Burnside and Dollar (2000) found that the impact of aid on growth
of recipients is positive with good ￿scal, monetary, and trade policies but has little e⁄ect on
recipients with poor policies.2 This suggests that aid would be more e⁄ective if it were more
systematically conditional on good policy responses of recipients. Moreover, they found no
evidence that aid has systematically a⁄ected policies of recipients. This ￿nding is in line with
the ￿nding by Boone (1996) that aid has no e⁄ect on investment and human development
indicators, while aid does increase the size of government. A number of other studies such as
the one by Alesina and Weder (2002) also concluded that the aid quantity does not alter the
quality of policies of recipient countries. They found that an increase in aid is likely to increase
corruption, probably because an unexpected transfer will induce rent-seeking activities.
Finally, on the donor-recipient relationship, there is an emerging new theoretical approach
to aid in which aid is analyzed as a contract between donors as principals and a recipient as
an agent. Under asymmetric information, Svensson (2000) focuses on moral hazard issues of
recipient countries and shows that the Samaritan￿ s dilemma is an inherent outcome of the aid
relationship without a credible commitment device. Svensson (2003) provides empirical evidence
of the lack of commitment in aid disbursements. Hagen (2005) and Torsvik (2005) discuss the
pros and cons of the role of multilateral aid agencies to mitigate the Samaritan￿ s dilemma. Azam
and La⁄ont (2003) add adverse selection of aid recipients, showing that aid can be oversupplied
to recipients with strong altruism.
2Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004), Roodman (2007), and Rajan and Subramanian (2008), however,
showed that the results of Burnside and Dollar (2000) are not robust.
3In this paper, we aim to make three contributions to the existing literature on foreign aid.
First, although Collier and Dollar (2002) evaluated the e¢ ciency of aid allocation with respect
to income increase by using aggregate data of all donors, they selected particular values for
poverty reduction elasticity of income. As far as we know, none of the existing studies has
investigated the e¢ ciency of aid provided by each donor in reducing poverty, using standard
poverty indicators. This paper tries to bridge this gap in the literature by examining each
donor￿ s aid allocation in terms of global poverty reduction without imposing restrictions on the
elasticity of poverty reduction.
Second, we extend the Besley and Kanbur (1988) framework of poverty reduction by consid-
ering multiple donors, recipients￿policy responses, possible strategic interactions among them,
and agency relationship between donors and recipients. Explicitly incorporating recipients￿pol-
icy responses is a critical distinction especially because the existing studies found the importance
of recipients￿governance in aid e⁄ectiveness (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000). Our theoretical
model includes three cases of aid allocation rules: donors￿joint minimization of global poverty
with budget pooling, unilateral minimization of global poverty without budget pooling, and uni-
lateral optimization with strategic motives. We attempt to test which version of the theoretical
models explains the data better. There are very few attempts in the literature similar to our
tests.
Third, our estimation covers two periods: 1996-1999 and 2001-2004. It is an important issue
to evaluate whether there has been an improvement in aid allocation patterns since the initiation
of the MDGs in 2000. Nevertheless, this issue has not been examined rigorously in the literature.
This paper attempts to shed new light on this important issue.
3 Theoretical Framework
In order to achieve the ￿rst goal of the MDGs, there are two requirements. First, aid should be
allocated to countries where poverty has been prevalent, not to relatively developed countries.
This is the requirement for e⁄ective aid allocation imposed on aid donors.
Second, in order to reduce poverty e⁄ectively, it is better to link external assistance more
with recipients￿e⁄orts. In countries where policies are inconsistent with poverty reduction,
foreign aid will achieve far less. This is partly due to the fungibility with which it is di¢ cult
4for donors to target particular groups. This is the requirement for e⁄ective aid which should be
satis￿ed within each aid recipient.
3.1 An Indicator of Global Poverty
To quantitatively evaluate the e⁄ectiveness of aid in terms of poverty reduction, we employ
the class of poverty measures developed by Foster et al. (1984), or the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke









where z is poverty line, yr is personal income, fr(￿) is its density function, and xr is an increment
of personal income of the poor through receiving aid. In this de￿nition, we con￿ne the type
of poverty reduction policies to a uniform transfer of xr to the poor. Also, we postulate two
assumptions here. First, poverty-reduction policies never cause the non-poor before the policies
to fall into poverty. Second, the shape of fr(yr) in the range of [0;z ￿ xr] does not change.
Therefore, the post-aid income density function of the initially poor is given by fr(yr + xr).
Then, we can utilize an additive decomposability property of the FGT measure in order to


















where Nr is recipient r￿ s population size and wr is its population weight in the world. The
de￿nition (1) can be interpreted as a formal representation of the criteria of global poverty
stated in the ￿rst goal of the MDGs.
3.2 Agency Issues
Suppose there exists a government between the poor in country r and multiple donors, and
that their complicated interactions determine the level of the increment of income from aid,
xr. Following the arguments by Azam and La⁄ont (2003) and Svensson (2000, 2003), we model
this relationship as a principal-agent problem. Let us denote that Md is the total aid budget of
donor d, which is assumed to be ￿xed exogenously, Mdr is the aid from donor d to recipient r,
5and mdr is the aid per recipient￿ s population from d to r (i.e., mdr =
Mdr
Nr ). Then, the incentive
compatibility constraint of the recipient is described as the recipient country￿ s optimization of
its objective function with respect to xr given di⁄erent intensities of incentive. First, the recipi-
ent￿ s optimization includes the minimization of Pr(￿), caring for the non-poor, maximization of
personal bene￿ts, and establishment of its political supporters. Second, behavioral constraints
include a budget constraint,
X
d
mdr ￿ xr, administrative ability constraints with respect to
targeting, conditionalities imposed by donors, and donors￿ability to enforce conditionalities.
We can represent the resulting incentive compatibility constraint by the following reduced-form
equation:
xr = xr(mr;Xr;Xd;Xdr); (2)
where mr is a vector of amounts of foreign aid received by recipient r from di⁄erent donors,
(m1r;m2r;:::;mdr;:::), Xr is the recipient government￿ s characteristics, Xd is the donors￿charac-
teristics, and Xdr is characteristics for the bilateral relationship between d and r. Since equation
(2) is a reduced-form incentive-compatibility constraint (ICC) governing the behavior of recipi-
ent r, donor d should take this equation into consideration when it determines mdr. From the
donor￿ s perspective, @xr
@mdr is a measure of the marginal aid impact on transfer to the poor, i.e.,
aid e⁄ectiveness, which can be a function of factors such as governance, colonial legacies, and
how pro-poor the economic structure of the recipient country is.
3.3 Optimal Aid Allocation
Setting the global poverty indicator of equation (1) as an ultimate criterion to achieve the ￿rst
MDG goal, we consider three possible cases of actual aid allocation: donors￿joint minimization
of global poverty with budget pooling, donors￿unilateral minimization of global poverty, and
donors￿unilateral optimization with strategic motives.
Case 1: Donors￿joint minimization of global poverty with budget pooling
We ￿rst assume that all donors jointly minimize the global poverty represented by equation
(1). This assumption corresponds to a situation of ultimate donor coordination to achieve the
MDGs. We further assume that all donors agree to pool their aid budgets. This assumption
can be interpreted as an extreme case of the general budget support (GBS) in non-project aid
to support recipients￿budgets.
6The optimization is then expressed as






















and equation (2), which is an incentive compatibility constraint. Equation (3) can be called
a global budget constraint. Assuming an interior solution for this problem, the ￿rst-order-















when mdr > 0,3 where ￿ is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the global aid budget con-
straint, i.e., equation (3).
This FOC indicates that all donors should equalize Pr(￿￿1) weighted by @xr
@mdr, where Pr(￿￿
1) is a poverty measure after the aid disbursements and resultant poverty reduction policies.
Denote that P0
r (￿ ￿ 1) is a poverty measure before transfers. By applying the implicit function
theorem, equation (4) implies that all donors should allocate aid mdr by using the same aid
allocation function, mdr = mr(P0
r (￿￿1);￿P;r;￿m;dr), where ￿P;r is a vector of exogenous shifters
of Pr(￿￿1) and ￿m;dr is a vector of exogenous shifters of @xr
@mdr.4 Note that the partial derivatives
of the three arguments should be positive. In other words, among donors and recipients, a
recipient with the highest initial poverty and a pair of a donor and a recipient with the highest
aid-e⁄ectiveness should be given the ￿rst priority.
Case 2: Unilateral minimization of global poverty under the identical objective
function
The ￿rst case above imposed an extreme assumption of global budget pooling for aid allo-
cation. Such an arrangement may not be enforced due to various incentive problems among
donors because it is di¢ cult to establish legally binding rules across donors. If we impose the
non-cooperative game assumption where each donor behaves individually, given other donors￿
behavior, but share the identical objective function, the optimization problem can be represented
3As a corner solution, when mdr = 0,
@xr
@mdr Pr(￿ ￿ 1) ￿
z
￿￿
4In deriving the aid allocation function, we also incorporate equation (2).
7as follows:


















equation (2), and fmdrgd06=d;r is given.
Maintaining the same objective function, i.e., the minimization of global poverty, the FOC
for an interior solution is
@xr
@mdr




when mdr > 0. This FOC indicates that each donor should equalize Pr(￿ ￿ 1) weighted by
@xr
@mdr. By applying the implicit function theorem, equation (6) with a donor-speci￿c Lagrange
multiplier associated with budget, ￿d, implies that the aid allocation function can now di⁄er by
donor, mdr = mdr(P0
r (￿￿1);￿P;r;￿m;dr), where the partial derivatives of these three arguments
should be positive. For each donor d, if we look at the aid distribution across recipients r, a
country with the highest aid-e⁄ectiveness and the highest initial poverty should be given ￿rst
priority.
Case 3: Aid allocation under strategic motives
In reality, some donors may be largely motivated by political considerations rather than altruism.
In order to incorporate donors￿di⁄erent optimization problems, we allow each donor to have
di⁄erent objectives. For a donor, poverty reduction in a recipient should be weighted more
heavily than poverty reduction in another recipient when the recipient is a part of the donor￿ s
strategic alliance. For another donor, the absolute amount of aid ￿ ow to some groups of countries
may be more important than the reduction of global poverty in order to establish and maintain
its political in￿ uence on the recipients. To take into account these aspects, we postulate the
following optimization problem:
Maxfmdrgr ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)P(￿) + ￿dGd(fmdrgr;fmd0rgd06=d;r) (7)
subject to equation (2), equation (5), and fmdrgd06=d;r is given, where Gd is donor d￿ s non-
poverty reduction objective that is assumed to be an increasing function of mdr, and ￿d is a
weight attached to this objective. In this formulation, we assume that giving more aid to a
8politically important country brings additional payo⁄ to the donor. Note that the Case 2 above
is a special instance of the Case 3 where ￿d = 0.











when mdr > 0. As we can see in equation (8), the second term of the left hand side is the addi-
tional term capturing strategic motives. Applying the implicit function theorem, each donor￿ s
aid allocation should now follow a function mdr = mdr(P0
r (￿￿1);￿P;r;￿m;dr;￿G;dr), where ￿G;dr
is a vector of exogenous shifters of ￿d
@Gd
@mdr. When ￿G;dr is higher (i.e., the marginal utility of
donor d from giving aid to recipient r is larger), ￿d
@Gd
@mdr becomes larger so that the optimal level
of aid mdr should be higher. Simply, the higher the marginal utility from giving aid through
strategic considerations, the more aid goes to such a recipient, regardless of its poverty situation.
Note that ￿d itself is also an important contributing factor. In the extreme case where ￿d=1,
the optimal level of aid is determined by strategic factors only, not by the degree of poverty,
P0
r (￿ ￿ 1); because mdr = mdr(￿G;dr) in this case.
4 Empirical Strategies and Data
4.1 Empirical Strategies
The theoretical discussion above has shown that mdr increases with ￿P;r (Cases 1-3), ￿m;dr (Cases
1-3), and ￿G;dr (Case 3). Accordingly, our strategy is to estimate a reduced form equation:
mdr = hd(P0
r (￿ ￿ 1);Xr;Xdr) (9)
where Xr is a vector of characteristics of recipient r and Xdr is a vector of variables characterizing
the relation between donor d and recipient r. Xr and Xdr jointly are proxy variables for ￿P;r,
￿m;dr, and ￿G;dr:
Suppose that the global poverty index in equation (1) is de￿ned as the squared poverty gap
index, i.e., ￿ equals two, satisfying the transfer axiom as clari￿ed by Foster et al. (1984). Then
a log-linearlized version of equation (9) is employed for estimation:
ln(1 + mdr) = b0;d + b1;d lnP0
r (1) + Xr￿1;r + Xdr￿2;d + u; (10)
where u represents an error term.
9There are three empirically veri￿able hypotheses derived from the theoretical results and
tested in the empirical part of this paper. First, if a donor￿ s aid allocation is consistent with
poverty reduction (Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3 with ￿d < 1), we should observe that b1;d > 0.
Second, the functional form hd(￿) should be identical for all donors under Case 1, while they
should di⁄er from donor to donor under Cases 2 & 3. Therefore, if the ￿rst test shows that
b1;d > 0, we test whether b1;d = b1 8d. If this null hypothesis cannot be rejected, Case 1 is
supported empirically against the alternatives of Cases 2 & 3. Finally, when a proxy variable
for ￿G;dr take coe¢ cients which are not statistically di⁄erent from zero, Case 3 is rejected in
favor of Cases 1 & 2. Among the explanatory variables described below, we regard a recipient￿ s
population size in Xr, colonial history, and UN voting patterns in Xdr as mainly re￿ ecting the
strategic motives, although we acknowledge the possibility that these variables also re￿ ect the
aid e⁄ectiveness represented by ￿m;dr.
Note that there are many zeros for the dependent variable in equation (10), since a donor
does not necessarily give aid to all potential recipient countries. If such aid-provision decisions
are correlated with unobserved factors a⁄ecting the aid amount, OLS estimation of equation
(10) will su⁄er from a standard sample selection bias. Accordingly, we employ the Type I Tobit
model of Amemiya (1985) to estimate equation (10).
4.2 Data
We employ data from eleven donor countries (France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, UK, US,
Canada, Italy, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) and six international institutions (IBRD, IDA,
UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, and UNICEF), together with internationally comparable poverty
data.
Our data is on the 98 aid-recipient countries listed on Table 1. The total population of
these countries was 4.727 billion as of 1999, covering 92.9 percent of the total population of all
aid-recipient countries in the same year. Table 2 shows that out of the total grant provisions
of each donor, our data set covers 63.8 percent for France, 81.7 percent for Germany, 86.7
percent for Japan, 69.5 percent for the Netherlands, 85.0 percent for the UK, 88.6 percent for
the US, 87.8 percent for Canada, 68.2 percent for Italy, 76.7 percent for Finland, 64.1 percent for
Norway, and 79.4 percent for Sweden. As to the total o¢ cial gross amount of each international
institution, the coverage rates are as follows: IBRD (97.0 percent), IDA (96.1 percent), UNDP
10(78.4 percent), UNFPA (83.5 percent), UNHCR (77.1 percent), and UNICEF (55.3 percent).
In order to capture behavioral changes of donors in response to the MDGs, we estimate the
model of equation (10) for two periods, one for 1996-1999 and the other for 2001-2004. The
former and latter periods are before and after, respectively, the initiation of the MDGs.
Dependent Variables
OECD de￿nes o¢ cial development assistance (ODA) as a net sum of grants, including tied and
technical assistance, and highly concessional loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent.
Yet, Chang, Fernandez-Arias, and Serven (1998) pointed that the net ￿ ow underestimates the
aid content of disbursed ￿ ows by netting out amortization payments. They also pointed that
the threshold of 25 percent of grant elements for concessionality of loan over-represents loans
with high concessionality and under-represents loans with low concessionality. Hence, we employ
logged values of per capita gross grant, distinguishing from loans, as our dependent variable,
which are total ODA/OA grant from OECD (2007) averaged over 1996-1999 and 2001-2004. We
de￿ ated this variable by using the donor country de￿ ator in OECD (2007) to make adjustments
for exchange rate and price changes. With respect to the multinational institutions data, note
that the amount of total o¢ cial gross disbursement is equivalent to the total o¢ cial gross amount
including OOF for IBRD, gross ODA loan for IDA, and ODA grant for UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR,
and UNDP. These multinational institution data are de￿ ated by applying de￿ ator of combined
DAC countries in OECD (2007). The upper two blocks of Tables 3 and 4 shows the descriptive
statistics on each donor￿ s aid ￿ ow for 1996-1999 and 2001-2004 separately.
Independent variables
As to the independent variables, we extract data in or around 1995 and 2001. The descriptive
statistics of the independent variables are shown at the last block of Table 3 for 1995 and Table
4 for 2001. The poverty gap measure for each recipient country in the sample at around 1995
and 2000 is shown in Table 5.
First, poverty gap indices are taken from the World Bank￿ s PovcalNet data ￿le. Since the
survey years of original household surveys vary by country to some extent, we adopt an index at
the nearest of 1995 or 2000 by assuming poverty indices are stable in the short run. The poverty
index of Israel is calculated from its income distribution statistics by assuming a log-normal
11income distribution function [Central Bureau of Statistics (1995)].
Second, in order to capture recipient speci￿c variables, Xr, we employ two sets of indicators:
political rights indices by Freedom House (2000) in 1995 and 2000, and government e⁄ective-
ness indices by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999, 2002) in 1996 and 2000. Freedom
House (2000) does not consider governments per se, but rather rights and freedoms enjoyed by
individuals in each country or territory. The index captures not only the political conditions in
a country or territory, such as the prevalence of terrorism or war, but also the e⁄ect that these
conditions have on freedom. Note that its political rights index ranges from 1 (best) to 7 (worst).
With respect to the second set of indicators, Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999, 2002)
have combined more than 300 governance indicators to construct six aggregate indicators cor-
responding to six fundamental governance concepts, one of which is government e⁄ectiveness.
Their government e⁄ectiveness index captures the capacity of governments to manage resources
e¢ ciently and to formulate, implement, and enforce sound policies and regulations. This is the
index we employ.
Third, following existing studies such as Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Alesina and Weder
(2002), we include a log of the total population of a recipient country to capture non-linearity
of the aid amount with respect to the country size. The data is extracted from World Bank
(2001). In fact, the non-linearity between aid allocation and population size can be interpreted
as a re￿ ection of strategic motives, ￿G;dr. For example, in the UN assembly, each country has
one vote regardless of its population size. Therefore, a smaller country may be able to attract




so that the donor￿ s optimization problem is to minimize
X
r
(wr +￿)Pr(￿), where the condition
￿ > 0 captures the weight attached to each country regardless of its population size. Under this










for mdr > 0. It is straightforward to show that, ceteris paribus, a less populated recipient, i.e.,
with lower wr, receives a larger amount of aid per capita.5
5This is an interpretation based on Case 3 of the theoretical model, i.e., the population size is a shifter of
@Gd
@mdr . It is also possible that the population size a⁄ects
@xr
@mdr as in Case 2, if the central government in a more
populated country is less e¢ cient in implementing poverty reduction policies than one in a less populated country,
simply because of the size of the country. Our intuition is that the latter e⁄ect, even when it exists, is likely to
be small.
12Finally, in order to capture other strategic aspects of foreign aid, ￿G;dr, we include other
donor-recipient speci￿c variables, Xdr, which have been employed in the previous studies as
possible determinants of foreign aid. Especially, following Alesina and Dollar (2000), we include
colonial history and UN voting patterns. The two colonial past variables included are de￿ned
as the number of years as a colony of the donor and as the number of years as a colony of
any country other than the donor since 1900. These data are extracted from CIA (1998). We
also include the UN-Voting Similarity variable of Gartzke, Jo, and Tucker (1999) and Voeten
(2006), which captures the similarity of foreign policy positions based on votes and resolutions
by recorded or roll-call vote at the UN General Assembly. To some extent, these variables may
also re￿ ect aid e⁄ectiveness (proxy for ￿m;dr). While we will discuss this issue later, we believe
that, by including these variables, we can mitigate potential bias due to an omission of important
variables.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 The Basic Model
The basic estimation results of equation (10) without donor-recipient speci￿c variables Xdr are
presented in Table 6 for 1996-1999 and in Table 7 for 2001-2004. According to Table 6, grant
allocations of Canada, France, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, and the U.K i.e., six out of
eleven donor countries have positive and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients on the poverty gap
indicator, although the coe¢ cient of Norway is marginally signi￿cant at the 10% level. These
six donor countries provide more grants to the recipient countries where poverty is severe. The
results are consistent with the theory of poverty targeting. All other countries have positive
coe¢ cients on poverty gap, but they are not statistically signi￿cant.
In Table 7, which summarizes the basic results for 2001-2004, grant allocations of Canada,
France, Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK i.e., ￿ve out of eleven donor countries have positive
and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients on the poverty gap indicator. Again, all other countries
have positive coe¢ cients on the poverty gap, but they are not statistically signi￿cant. It may
seem surprising that all three Nordic countries (Finland, Norway, and Sweden) have insigni￿cant
coe¢ cients because aid allocations by these countries are usually regarded as sensitive to poverty.
However, when we look closely at the data, it is found that the Nordic countries provided much
13aid to Eastern European economies where poverty gap indices were not necessarily high. This
makes the poverty-aid nexus of the Nordic countries less clear in our analysis.
On the other hand, no donor country is sensitive to political rights when it allocates grants.
This is true in both periods (1996-1999 and 2001-2004). As for the government e⁄ectiveness
index, Japan has a signi￿cantly positive coe¢ cient in 1996-1999, implying Japan gave more aid
to countries with high government e⁄ectiveness, although this relation vanishes in 2001-2004.
The US has a signi￿cantly negative coe¢ cient in 2001-2004, suggesting a possibility that the US
gave more aid to countries with low government e⁄ectiveness.
With respect to the population variable, we ￿nd that its coe¢ cients are negative and statis-
tically signi￿cant for nine out of eleven donor countries in 1996-1999, and for ten out of eleven
countries in 2001-2004. When a recipient country￿ s population is large, donors will allocate less
aid per population of the recipient. As we have seen already, this non-linearity between aid al-
location and population size may be a product of aid e⁄ectiveness. Furthermore, if we interpret
that the population e⁄ect comes from strategic motives, we can validate Case 3 against Cases
1 & 2. However, note that the population e⁄ect may come from the incentive compatibility
constraint (2). If that is the case, we cannot validate Case 3 against Cases 1 & 2.
5.2 Colonial History and Political Alliance
As Alesina and Dollar (2000) found, aid donor countries may be motivated by strategic consid-
erations, rather than poverty reduction of the recipient countries. In order to control for donors￿
preference toward former colonies or strategic aid allocation, we have included the colonial past
variables and the UN Voting Similarity variables. The results are summarized in Table 8 for
1996-1999 and in Table 9 for 2001-2004.
In 1996-1999, once the colonial past variable is included, the statistical signi￿cance of the
poverty gap coe¢ cient for the UK disappears. However, the coe¢ cient of the UK in 2001-2004
survives to be positive and signi￿cant even after controlling for the colonial variable. The other
three countries (France, Japan, and the Netherlands) that have positive and signi￿cant coe¢ -
cients on poverty measure in the basic speci￿cation all have positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cients
even after controlling for the colonial variable in both periods. The coe¢ cient on the colonial
variable is positive and statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level for France and the UK in
both periods and is marginally signi￿cant for Japan. These results indicate that being formerly
14an own colony is an important determinant of aid allocation especially for France, Japan, and
the UK.
The coe¢ cient of France on the UN voting variable is positive and signi￿cant in 1996-1999,
which suggests that France provided a larger amount of aid to its allied countries in the UN. But,
this relation vanishes in 2001-2004. On the other hand, the coe¢ cient of Japan on the UN voting
variable became signi￿cant in 2001-2004, but was not signi￿cant in 1996-1999, implying Japan￿ s
grant allocation might become more sensitive to its strategic motives after the initiation of the
MDGs. This period overlaps with the timing when Japanese government sought a permanent
seat of the UN￿ s security council
5.3 Multilateral Institutions
The results for multilateral donors are summarized in Table 10 for 1996-1999 and in Table 11 for
2001-2004. First, it is notable that the two World Bank organizations, IBRD and IDA, show a
clear contrast in both periods. While IDA targets poverty signi￿cantly, the allocation of IBRD
shows a strong poverty-aversion pattern. This is plausible because the primal mandate of IDA
is to provide aid to the low countries whose GNP per capita is, for example, less than 905 US
dollars in 1995 (World Bank, 1996). These low-income recipient countries are more likely to have
larger poverty gap indices. On the other hand, IBRD allocates loans to relatively developed,
middle-income countries.
Results for other UN agencies indicate that the coe¢ cients on the poverty gap are positive
and signi￿cant except for UNHCR in both periods, indicating that these institutions allocated
funds in a way consistent with the theory of poverty targeting. In contrast, UNHCR does not
seem sensitive to poverty or governance per se. This pattern may emerge because UNHCR￿ s
primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees regardless of the governance.
Moreover, the targeted refugees might be relocated to relatively developed countries where
poverty is less serious.
Interestingly, while the political rights index had no impact on the aid allocation of mul-
tilateral donors in 1996-1999, it became positive and statistically signi￿cant for IDA, UNDP,
UNFPA, and UNICEF in 2001-2004. This implies that these donors have given more aid to less
democratic countries in recent years. Government e⁄ectiveness does not seem to be a crucial
factor in the aid allocation of multilateral donors.
15With respect to the population size, all international agencies except IBRD and UNHCR
allocated less aid per capita to more populated countries. IBRD￿ s aid allocation is insensitive
to the population size of the recipient countries possibly because its main function is to ￿nance
public infrastructure rather than ￿nancing procurement of excludable goods.
5.4 Testing Donors￿Joint Minimization of Global Poverty Hypothesis
The formal hypothesis test concerning Case 1 vs. Cases 2 & 3 requires a test of cross-equation
(or cross-donor) restrictions because we need to compare the coe¢ cients on the poverty gap
across the bilateral donors. We apply a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework to
equation (10) to test cross-equation restrictions. Since the numbers of left-censored samples are
negligible for bilateral donors except Finland, we report estimation results based on a linear
SUR speci￿cation.6 To check the robustness of the hypothesis test results, we implement two
speci￿cations, i.e., basic one and the one including colonial past & political alliance, and two
sets of bilateral donors, i.e., major six donors and all the eleven donors.
Tables 12 to 16 show the SUR estimation results regarding various speci￿cation and two
sets of bilateral donors for 1996-1999. Because most of the same qualitative results as the
equation-by-equation estimation are maintained under the SUR speci￿cation, we concentrate on
the results of the joint hypothesis test in this subsection. At the bottom row in each table, we
show the p-value of the joint test of the equality hypothesis of the coe¢ cients on the poverty
gap across the bilateral donors.
For the period 1996-1999, Tables 12 to 16 show that the joint test of equality of the coe¢ cients
on the poverty gap across the bilateral donors is rejected regardless of the speci￿cation and the
choice of donor sets. This implies that in 1996-1999, we reject Case 1 in favor of Cases 2 & 3
strongly.
In sharp contrast, the results for 2001-2004 in Tables 17 to 21 show several cases in which
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the equality of the coe¢ cients on the poverty gap across
the bilateral donors. Especially, if we restrict the sample to 6 major bilateral donors, we cannot
reject the hypothesis on joint equality of the coe¢ cients on the poverty gap across the donors
6We attempted to estimate a joint Tobit model with recipient-country-speci￿c latent factors through the
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method. However, the posterior sampling of several parameters was not
stable. We therefore do not report the estimation results here, but the programs and notes are available from the
corresponding author upon request.
16(Tables 17 and 19). This implies that if we focus on the grant allocation of major bilateral
donors, the allocation pattern is coming closer to the coordinated global poverty minimization
of Case 1, which is consistent with the MDG target 1. However, the evidence becomes mixed
if we expand the donors or the explanatory variables. Once all eleven donors are considered
simultaneously, we reject the null hypothesis (Table 18). After adding the colonial past and
political alliance variables for six major donors, the p-value for the hypothesis becomes 0.057
(Table 20). In this case, we reject the hypothesis at the 10% level but not at the 5% level. Also,
we can see that the extreme version of Case 3, i.e., the case where ￿d=1, is rejected strongly.
On the other hand, the signi￿cant coe¢ cients on population variables can be interpreted as the
case where ￿d 6=1.
In sum, in comparing the periods of 1996-1999 and 2001-2004, we observe an improvement
in grant allocation in terms of coordinated global poverty reduction among major donors. Yet
it seems that there is still large room for further progress in their coordination.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we ￿rst proposed an empirically testable model of the optimal aid allocation for
the global poverty reduction in the late-1990s and the early-2000s. We then tested theoretical
predictions, using detailed data on grant aid allocation of eleven major aid donor countries and
six international institutions. Three ￿ndings emerged from our empirical analysis, which may
provide important policy implications. First, aid allocations of Canada, France, Japan, the
Netherlands, the UK, and multilateral donors except IBRD and UNHCR have been consistent
with the theory of global poverty targeting, in the sense that aid was provided to a higher level
of poverty gaps.
Second, almost no donor country was sensitive to political rights or governance of recipient
countries when it allocated grants. Moreover, even for multilateral donors, fund allocation was
not responsive to political or governance indicators. While our results are consistent with the
￿nding by Alesina and Weder (2002), aid allocation should be targeted more to countries with
better political rights and governance to reduce poverty further at the global level.
Finally, the comparison of the period of 1996-1999 and that of 2001-2004 indicates a recent
improvement in grant allocation in terms of coordinated global poverty reduction among major
17donors. This may re￿ ect the favorable impact on the aid donor community in reducing global
poverty since the initiation of the MDGs in 2000. Yet it seems that there is still large room for
further progress in their coordination.
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Table 1: Recipient countries in sample 
Source: see text. 
 
 
East Asia    Sub Sahara Africa Central  America  East Europe and  
China   Benin  Costa  Rica  Former Soviet Union  
Mongolia   Botswana  Dominican  Republic (except Central Asia) 
    Burkina Faso  El Salvador  Albania 
South East Asia  Burundi Guatemala  Belarus 
Cambodia   Cameroon  Haiti  Bulgaria 
Indonesia   Central African Republic  Honduras Croatia 
Lao PDR    Cote d'Ivoire  Jamaica  Czech Republic 
Malaysia    Ethiopia Mexico Estonia 
Myanmar   Gambia,  The  Nicaragua  Hungary 
Philippine
s 
 Ghana  Panama  Latvia 
Thailand   Kenya  St.  Lucia  Lithuania 
Vietnam    Lesotho  Trinidad and Tobago Macedonia, FYR 
   Madagascar   Moldova 
South Asia  Malawi  Latin America  Poland 
Bangladesh Mali  Argentina  Romania 
India   Namibia  Bolivia  Russian  Federation 
Pakistan   Niger  Brazil  Slovak  Republic 
Sri Lanka    Nigeria  Chile  Slovenia 
   Rwanda  Ecuador  Ukraine 
Central Asia  Senegal Guyana   
Armenia    Sierra Leone  Paraguay  Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Azerbaija
n 
 South  Africa  Peru   
Georgia   Swaziland  Uruguay  Israel 
Kazakhstan Tanzania  Venezuela,  RB   
Kyrgyz Republic  Uganda     
Tajikistan   Zambia  Middle East and North Africa 
Turkmenistan Zimbabwe  Algeria   
Uzbekista
n 
    Iran, Islamic Rep.   
     Jordan   
     Mauritania  
     Morocco   
     Tunisia   
     Turkey   
     Yemen,  Rep.    
  23
Table 2: Coverage of sample in aid amount (in 1999) 
  Amount covered in the 
sample corresponding to 
the 98 recipient countries 
(million US$) [1] 
Total amount from 
each donor (million 
US$) [2] 
Coverage (%)       
[1]/[2]*100 
      
Amount of grant 
provision  
    
  France   2188.6 3429.9  63.8 
  Germany  1945.3 2380.7  81.7 
  Japan  3601.9 4153.8  86.7 
  Netherlands   1030.7 1482.3  69.5 
  UK  1705.2 2005.5  85.0 
  US.  5988.0 6755.1  88.6 
  Canada  608.4 693.3  87.8 
  Italy  337.5 495.2  68.2 
  Finland  134.7 175.6  76.7 
  Norway  443.9 692.9  64.1 
  Sweden  644.2 810.9  79.4 
 
Amount of gross 
disbursement 
     
  IBRD  13216.2 13622.4  97.0 
  IDA  5098.7 5305.7  96.1 
  UNDP  253.0 322.8  78.4 
  UNFPA  97.0 116.2  83.5 
  UNHCR  257.4 334.1  77.1 
  UNICEF  236.5 427.2  55.3 

















Table 3: Descriptive statistics (1996-99) 
Variable    Sample mean  Sample std. dev.  #. of left censored 
Grant        
(per capita, average over 96 to 99, US$)    
France     2.23  4.14  0 
Germany   2.30 2.97  1 
Japan   2.66  4.53  0 
Netherlands   0.90  1.29  3 
UK   1.87  8.22  1 
US   3.67  10.87  2 
Canada   0.51  0.87 2 
Italy   0.26  0.88  12 
Finland   0.18  0.67 25 
Norway   0.46  0.91  9 
Sweden   0.65  1.33  5 
       
Total Official Gross      
(per capita, average over 96 to 99, US$)    
IBRD   5.80  13.96  38 
IDA   4.05  6.35  47 
UNDP   0.36  0.57 2 
UNFPA   0.14  0.31  6 
UNHCR   0.15 0.37  15 
UNICEF   0.26 0.38  13 
       
Independent Variables      
Poverty Gap at $1 a day (%)    8.20  11.60   
Population (million, 1995)  44.83  153.22   
Political Rights Index (1995)  3.90  1.94   
Government Effectiveness(1996)  -0.34  0.59   
Colonial Past   43.07  31.80   
   (number of years since 1900)     
Years of French Colony  10.56  22.48   
Years of German Colony  0.32  2.30   
Years of Japanese Colony  0.15  0.75   
Years of Dutch Colony  0.47  4.65   
Years of UK Colony  14.16  25.53   
Years of US Colony  0.42  4.14   
UN-Voting Similarity (1996)     
France     0.81 0.10   
Germany    0.86 0.10   
Japan    0.88 0.09   
Netherlands   0.84  0.11   
UK    0.48 0.22   
US    0.15  0.34   
Sample Size        98 
Source: see text. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics (2001-2004) 
Variable     Sample mean  Sample std. dev.  # of left censored 
Grant        
(per capita, average over 2001 to 2004, US$)   
France     2.04  3.18  0 
Germany   2.45 3.90  0 
Japan   2.34  3.74  0 
Netherlands   1.11  1.88  0 
UK   1.21  2.64  1 
US   5.59  11.21  1 
Canada   0.53  0.89 0 
Italy   0.32  0.87  3 
Finland   0.16  0.48 10 
Norway   0.38  0.65  4 
Sweden   0.67  1.88  3 
       
Total Official Gross     
(per capita, average over 2001 to 2004, US$)   
IBRD   3.28  5.57  43 
IDA   3.80  5.37  46 
UNDP   0.19  0.24 1 
UNFPA   0.12  0.14  7 
UNHCR   0.23  0.45  19 
UNICEF   0.17 0.19  12 
       
Independent Variables     
Poverty Gap at $1 a day (%)    7.19  10.29   
Population (million, 2000)  48.21  163.89   
Political Rights Index (2000)     
Government Effectiveness(2000)  -0.27  0.64   
Colonial Past   43.07  31.80   
   (number of years since 1900)     
Years of French Colony  10.56  22.48   
Years of German Colony  0.32  2.30   
Years of Japanese Colony  0.15  0.75   
Years of Dutch Colony  0.47  4.65   
Years of UK Colony  14.16  25.53   
Years of US Colony  0.42  4.14   
UN-Voting Similarity (2000)     
France     0.77 0.12   
Germany    0.77 0.13   
Japan    0.95 0.10   
Netherlands   0.77  0.13   
UK    0.67 0.15   
US    0.13 0.28    
Sample Size        98 
Source: see text.  
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Table 5: Poverty gap measure (1995, 2000)        
East Asia 1995 2000   Sub  Sahara 
Africa 
1995 2000  Central 
America 
1995 2000   East Europe and Former Soviet Union (except Central 
Asia)  
China  6.60 3.12      Benin  8.42 8.42    Costa  Rica  1.09 0.66    1995 2000
Mongolia 0.08  0.08     Botswana  10.14  10.14    Dominican 
Rep blic
0.38 0.19    Albania  0.01  0.04 
      Burkina  Faso  19.50  7.62    El  Salvador  8.17  8.54    Belarus  0.52  0.00 
South East Asia      Burundi  22.68 22.68   Guatemala  4.03  2.71   Bulgaria  1.37  0.59 
Cambodia 37.77  27.24      Cameroon 10.56  5.17    Haiti  26.87  26.87   Croatia 0.00  0.00 
Indonesia  2.28  1.04     Central African 
Rep blic
40.04 40.04   Honduras  9.52 3.83    Czech  Republic 0.00  0.00 
Lao PDR  6.31  6.26     Cote d'Ivoire  2.41  4.14    Jamaica  0.61  0.00    Estonia  0.09  0.00 
Malaysia  0.10 0.01      Ethiopia  7.95 4.47    Mexico  2.39 1.58    Hungary  0.00  0.00 
Myanmar  13.97  13.97     Gambia, The  9.47  9.47    Nicaragua  20.36  18.11    Latvia  0.00  0.00 
Philippines  3.76  2.38      Ghana  12.89 12.89   Panama  2.57  2.28   Lithuania  0.00  0.18 
Thailand  0.15 0.06      Kenya  9.03 2.40    St.  Lucia 8.45  8.45    Macedonia,  FYR  0.00  0.69 
Vietnam  0.48  0.10      Lesotho  18.97 18.97   1.28  1.28   Moldova  1.59  3.62 
      Madagascar  18.88  27.91   
Trinidad and 
Tobago      Poland  0.00  0.06 
South Asia       Malawi  4.71  4.71    Latin America     Romania  0.76  0.59 
Bangladesh  7.38 10.42      Mali  37.39 11.86   Argentina  0.20  0.55   Russian  Federation  1.71  1.20 
India  13.89 8.42      Namibia  8.96 5.55    Bolivia  9.66  13.14    Slovak  Republic  0.06  0.06 
Pakistan 2.32  3.00      Niger  21.31  21.31   Brazil  3.88  2.09    Slovenia  0.00  0.00 
Sri Lanka  1.00  1.51     Nigeria  40.46  34.59    Chile  0.00  0.08    Ukraine  0.64  0.17 
      Rwanda  7.41  25.57    Ecuador  6.56  6.32         
Central Asia      Senegal  6.25  3.57   Guyana  0.43  0.43   Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  0.45  0.44 
Armenia  1.48  1.14     Sierra Leone  40.62  40.62    Paraguay  8.27  7.37         
Azerbaijan  3.23  0.62     South Africa  0.56  2.26    Peru  3.02  9.14    Israel  0.00  0.00 
Georgia  0.00  0.88      Swaziland  37.73 19.30   Uruguay  0.20  0.05        
Kazakhstan  0.32  0.02     Tanzania  22.70  20.64    Venezuela, RB  2.86  8.36         
Kyrgyz Republic  0.29  0.23     Uganda  47.30  43.30                 
Tajikistan 3.44  1.21      Zambia  37.39  29.69    Middle East and North Africa      
Turkmenistan  5.30  2.59      Zimbabwe  24.17 24.17   Algeria  0.22  0.22        
Uzbekistan  0.46  0.00            Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  0.10  0.04         
            Jordan  0.10  0.02         
            Mauritania  9.09  7.57         
            Morocco  16.38  11.62         
            Tunisia  0.19  0.07         
            Turkey  0.55  0.20         
            Yemen,  Rep.  2.10  2.10         
Source: PovcalNet,  World  Bank                    
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Table 6: Basic Results, ODA Grant Allocation of 11 Bilateral Donors (Tobit, 1996-1999) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
 France Germany Japan  Netherlands UK  US  Canada Italy  Finland Norway Sweden 
                 
Poverty  Gap  0.066 0.012 0.111 0.058  0.063 0.006 0.035 -0.003  -0.008  0.027  0.014 
 (2.31)** (0.58)  (4.81)***(3.24)***  (2.63)***  (0.18) (2.56)** (0.28)  (0.58)  (1.81)*  (0.74) 
Political  Rights  -0.002 -0.035 -0.025 -0.03  -0.032 -0.054 -0.035 -0.004  -0.01  -0.013  -0.02 
  (0.04) (1.11) (0.68) (1.07)  (0.85) (1.12) (1.6)  (0.22)  (0.46) (0.54)  (0.68) 
Government  Effectiveness  0.056 0.018 0.306 -0.044 0.082  -0.196  -0.006  -0.068  -0.049  -0.046  0.004 
  (0.37) (0.17) (2.49)** (0.46)  (0.63) (1.20) (0.08) (1.00)  (0.67) (0.57)  (0.04) 
Population  -0.156 -0.183 -0.235 -0.108  -0.207 -0.21  -0.069 -0.023  -0.01  -0.079  -0.094 
 (2.98)*** (5.04)*** (5.56)***(3.35)***  (4.70)***  (3.77)*** (2.74)***(1.01) (0.39)  (2.90)*** (2.78)*** 
Constant  2.217 2.823 3.315 1.584  2.587 3.081 1.082 0.347  0.155  1.02  1.28 
 (4.61)*** (8.48)*** (8.54)***(5.35)***  (6.40)***  (6.01)*** (4.68)***(1.63) (0.65)  (4.07)*** (4.10)*** 
# of Obs  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 7: Basic Results, ODA Grant Allocation of Bilateral Donors (Tobit, 2001-2004) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
 France Germany Japan  Netherlands UK  US  Canada Italy  Finland Norway Sweden 
                 
Poverty  Gap  0.075 0.034 0.096 0.058  0.079 0.007 0.024 0.014  0.008 0.016  0.02 
 (2.85)*** (1.53)  (4.38)*** (3.13)***  (3.66)***  (0.22) (1.94)*  (1.14)  (0.83)  (1.32) (1.11) 
Political  Rights  0.024 -0.003  0.009 -0.036  0.02 -0.044  -0.018  0.009  -0.001  0.004  -0.01 
  (0.58) (0.08) (0.27) (1.2)  (0.58) (0.81) (0.92) (0.45)  (0.10) (0.18)  (0.37) 
Government  Effectiveness  0.209 0.1  0.169 -0.127 0.011  -0.428  -0.045  -0.05  0.052  -0.083  -0.032 
  (1.45) (0.82) (1.40) (1.25)  (0.10) (2.32)**  (0.67) (0.73)  (1.00) (1.22)  (0.33) 
Population  -0.143 -0.183 -0.223 -0.116  -0.131 -0.233 -0.095 -0.037  -0.032 -0.058  -0.084 
 (2.96)*** (4.46)*** (5.52)*** (3.42)***  (3.31)***  (3.76)*** (4.22)*** (1.62) (1.85)*  (2.54)**  (2.56)** 
Constant  2.063 2.712 3.001 1.737  1.67 3.515  1.28 0.494  0.414  0.754  1.177 
 (4.55)*** (7.04)*** (7.90)*** (5.45)***  (4.49)***  (6.05)*** (6.08)*** (2.28)** (2.52)** (3.51)*** (3.81)*** 
# of Obs  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 8: ODA Grant Allocation of Bilateral Donors, Colonial Past and Political Alliance (1996-1999) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 France  Germany  Japan  Netherlands  UK  US 
            
            
Poverty Gap  0.051  0.004  0.099  0.037  -0.016  0.009 
 (2.09)**  (0.18)  (4.26)***  (1.96)*  (0.7)  (0.25) 
Political Rights  -0.013  -0.023  -0.013  -0.03  -0.05  -0.046 
 (0.41)  (0.71)  (0.34)  (1.07)  (1.64)  (0.89) 
Government Effectiveness  0.069 -0.025 0.19  -0.16  -0.225  -0.192 
 (0.58)  (0.21)  (1.44)  (1.59)  (2.07)**  (1.13) 
Population -0.126  -0.214  -0.295  -0.143  -0.16  -0.222 
 (3.02)***  (5.37)***  (6.32)***  (4.06)***  (4.24)***  (3.48)*** 
UN Voting similarity  1.604  -0.413  -0.598  -1.296  -0.487  0.092 
 (2.37)**  (0.72)  (0.83)  (2.67)***  (1.79)*  (0.33) 
Years of this donor's colony  0.022  0.006  0.156  -0.001  0.017  0 
 (7.92)***  (0.27)  (1.88)*  (0.11)  (7.43)***  (0.01) 
Years of other donor's colony  -0.003  -0.003  -0.005  -0.002  0.001  -0.002 
 (1.89)*  (1.67)*  (2.19)**  (0.96)  (0.71)  (0.72) 
Constant 0.572  3.54  4.486  3.028  2.075  3.227 
 (0.73)  (5.07)***  (5.17)***  (5.13)***  (5.11)***  (5.31)*** 
Observations 98  98  98  98  98  98 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
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Table 9: ODA Grant Allocation of Bilateral Donors, Colonial Past and Political Alliance (2001-2004) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 France  Germany  Japan  Netherlands UK  US 
            
            
Poverty  Gap  0.04 0.04 0.068  0.058  0.047 0.002 
 (2.03)**  (1.66)  (2.93)***  (2.93)***  (2.30)**  (0.05) 
Political Rights  -0.015  0.015  -0.021  -0.039  -0.018  -0.045 
 (0.46)  (0.38)  (0.56)  (1.17)  (0.55)  (0.78) 
Government Effectiveness  0.121  0.124 0.096  -0.124  -0.099 -0.467 
 (1.14)  (0.96)  (0.82)  (1.16)  (0.93)  (2.46)** 
Population -0.141  -0.19  -0.262  -0.112  -0.067  -0.255 
 (3.87)***  (4.31)***  (6.21)***  (2.97)***  (1.79)*  (3.73)*** 
UN Voting similarity  0.409  0.415  1.692  -0.015  -0.172  -0.252 
 (0.85)  (0.74)  (2.51)**  (0.03)  (0.43)  (0.72) 
Years of this donor's colony  0.021  -0.012  0.184  0.003  0.014  -0.002 
 (7.94)***  (0.44)  (2.38)**  (0.25)  (5.76)***  (0.08) 
Years of other donor's colony  -0.003  -0.002  -0.002  0.001  0.004  -0.002 
 (1.70)*  (0.84)  (0.84)  (0.44)  (1.92)*  (0.5) 
Constant 1.727  2.481  1.895  1.686  0.987  3.816 
 (3.09)***  (3.69)***  (2.69)***  (3.07)***  (1.95)*  (5.57)*** 
Observations 98  98  98  98  98  98 
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Table 10: Basic Results, Total Official Gross of Multilateral Donors (1996-1999) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 IBRD  IDA  UNDP  UNFPA  UNHCR  UNICEF 
            
Poverty Gap  -0.209  0.243  0.034  0.023  0.013  0.034 
 (3.39)***  (3.18)*** (3.79)***  (3.85)***  -1.52  (4.52)*** 
Political Rights  -0.139  0.089  0.017  -0.004  -0.004  0.01 
 (1.40)  (0.83)  (1.23)  (0.41)  (0.27)  (0.86) 
Government Effectiveness  0.274  -0.654 -0.029  0.001  0.039  -0.015 
 (0.83)  (1.70)*  (0.6)  (0.05)  (0.86)  (0.39) 
Population 0.146  -0.335  -0.104  -0.043  -0.027  -0.078 
 (1.31)  (2.72)*** (6.41)***  (3.99)***  (1.75)*  (5.90)*** 
Constant -0.029  2.775  1.137  0.516  0.371  0.862 
 (0.03)  (2.47)**  (7.62)***  (5.20)***  (2.55)**  (7.06)*** 
# of Obs  98  98  98  98  98  98 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 11: Basic Results, Total Official Gross of Multilateral Donors (2001-2004) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 IBRD  IDA  UNDP  UNFPA  UNHCR  UNICEF 
            
Poverty Gap  -0.17  0.347  0.021  0.026  0.006  0.028 
 (2.90)***  (4.56)*** (4.54)***  (8.00)***  -0.56  (6.57)*** 
Political Rights  -0.165  0.171  0.018  0.01  0.024  0.02 
 (1.74)*  (1.73)*  (2.44)**  (2.03)**  -1.35  (3.00)*** 
Government Effectiveness  0.297 -0.434  -0.035 0.02  -0.037  -0.016 
 (0.92)  (1.24)  (1.39)  (1.16)  (0.61)  (0.72) 
Population 0.131  -0.233  -0.064  -0.034  -0.038  -0.05 
 (1.24)  (2.13)**  (7.63)***  (5.92)***  (1.86)*  (6.63)*** 
Constant -0.221  1.691  0.679  0.389  0.388  0.527 
 (0.22)  (1.59)  (8.66)***  (7.27)***  (1.98)*  (7.42)*** 
# of Obs  98  98  98  98  98  98 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 12: SUR estimation, Basic specification, six major bilateral donors (1996-1999) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 France  Germany  Japan  Netherlands  UK  US 
            
            
Poverty Gap  0.066  0.012  0.111  0.053  0.062  0.003 
  (2.25)** (0.61)  (4.69)***  (3.03)*** (2.54)**  (0.10) 
Political Rights  -0.001  -0.035  -0.025  -0.029  -0.032  -0.048 
 (0.04)  (1.11)  (0.66)  (1.06)  (0.83)  (0.99) 
Government Effectiveness  0.559  0.021 0.306  -0.066  0.098  -0.179 
 (0.36)  (0.20)  (2.42)**  (0.70)  (0.75)  (1.10)** 
Population -0.156  -0.185  -0.235  -0.110  -0.207  -0.206 
 (2.90)***  (5.03)***  (5.42)***  (3.41)***  (4.63)***  (3.66)*** 
Constant 2.217  2.849  3.314  1.602  2.600  3,035 
 (4.49)***  (8.44)***  (8.32)***  (5.40)***  (6.32)***  (5.87)*** 
# of Obs  98  98  98  98  98  98 
R-squared 0.12  0.25  0.35  0.21  0.24  0.16 
 
P-value for the same 
coefficient across donor 
   
[0.003]      
            
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Six equations in this table are jointly estimated by SUR. Each number on the column corresponds to the equation-by-equation estimation result 
reported in Table 6 with the same column number. 
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Table 13: SUR estimation, Basic specification, 11 bilateral donors (1996-1999) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 France  Germany Japan  Netherlands UK  US  Canada Italy Finland  Norway Sweden 
                 
                 
Poverty  Gap  0.066 0.012 0.111 0.054  0.062 0.003 0.033 -0.001  0  0.025  0.015 
  (2.25)** (0.61)  (4.69)*** (3.03)***  (2.54)** (0.1)  (2.39)** (0.12)  (0.03)  (1.78)*  (0.85) 
Political  Rights  -0.002 -0.035 -0.025 -0.03  -0.032 -0.048 -0.035 0.001  -0.013 -0.014  -0.02 
  (0.04) (1.11) (0.66) (1.06)  (0.83) (0.99) (1.6)  (0.06) (0.77) (0.62)  (0.68) 
Government  Effectiveness  0.056 0.021 0.306 -0.066  0.098 -0.18 0.005 -0.054  -0.013  -0.033  0 
  (0.36) (0.2)  (2.42)**  (0.7)  (0.75) (1.1)  (0.07) (0.88) (0.22) (0.44)  (0) 
Population  -0.156 -0.185 -0.235 -0.11  -0.207 -0.206 -0.07  -0.037 -0.039 -0.086  -0.103 
 (2.90)*** (5.03)*** (5.42)*** (3.41)***  (4.63)*** (3.66)*** (2.77)*** (1.77)*  (1.97)**  (3.36)***  (3.13)*** 
Constant  2.217 2.85  3.315 1.602  2.601 3.036 1.105 0.483 0.516 1.116  1.376 
 (4.49)*** (8.44)*** (8.32)*** (5.40)***  (6.32)*** (5.87)*** (4.73)*** (2.51)**  (2.82)*** (4.74)***  (4.53)*** 
#  of  Obs  98 98 98  98  98 98 98 98 98  98  98 
R-squared  0.13 0.25 0.36  0.21  0.24 0.16 0.15 0.04 0.06  0.15  0.12 
                 
P-value for the same 
coefficient across donor 
         [0.000]          
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Eleven equations in this table are jointly estimated by SUR.  Each column number corresponds to the equation-by-equation estimation result reported in Table 6 
with the same column number.   
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Table 14: SUR estimation, Colonial past and political alliances, six bilateral donors (1996-1999) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
 France  Germany  Japan  Netherlands  UK  US 
            
            
Poverty Gap  0.066  0.014  0.101  0.043  -0.012  0.018 
 (2.61)***  (0.67)  (4.17)***  (2.28)**  (0.53)  (0.53) 
Political Rights  -0.01  -0.019  -0.012  -0.027  -0.053  -0.043 
 (0.3)  (0.59)  (0.3)  (0.93)  (1.69)*  (0.82) 
Government Effectiveness  0.126  0.037  0.203  -0.125  -0.207  -0.138 
 (1.01)  (0.31)  (1.48)  (1.24)  (1.87)*  (0.79) 
Population -0.112  -0.202  -0.292 -0.131  -0.152  -0.205 
 (2.58)**  (4.94)***  (6.03)***  (3.69)***  (3.90)***  (3.15)*** 
UN Voting similarity  2.207  0.348  -0.288  -0.652  -0.297  0.328 
 (3.20)***  (0.65)  (0.39)  (1.45)  (1.13)  (1.24) 
Years of this donor's colony  0.021  -0.001  0.172  -0.003  0.018  0.003 
 (7.44)***  (0.07)  (2.10)**  (0.34)  (7.68)***  (0.16) 
Years of other donor's colony  -0.003  -0.003  -0.005  -0.001  0.001  -0.002 
 (1.68)*  (1.5)  (2.12)**  (0.78)  (0.58)  (0.8) 
Constant -0.04  2.773  4.186  2.368  1.924  3.062 
 (0.05)  (4.12)***  (4.73)***  (4.20)***  (4.66)***  (4.93)*** 
Observations 
 
98 98 98 98  98  98 
R-squared 0.59  0.26  0.4 
 
0.26 0.56  0.16 
P-value for the same 
coefficient across donor 
   [0.003]       
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets;  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Six equations in this table are jointly estimated by SUR. Each column number corresponds to the equation-by-equation estimation result reported in Table 8 with 
the same column number.  
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Table 15: SUR estimation: Colonial past and political alliances for six bilateral donors plus basic specification for other five bilateral donors (1996-
1999) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) 
 France  Germany Japan Netherlands UK  US Canada Italy Finland Norway Sweden 
        
       
Poverty Gap  0.077  0.014  0.102  0.043  -0.004  0.024  0.033  -0.001  0  0.025  0.015 
  (3.18)***  (0.65)  (4.24)***  (2.38)**  (0.17) (0.71) (2.39)** (0.12)  (0.03)  (1.78)* (0.85) 
Political Rights  -0.015  -0.018  -0.015  -0.028  -0.054 -0.047 -0.035  0.001 -0.013  -0.014  -0.02 
  (0.44)  (0.54) (0.4)  (0.99)  (1.74)* (0.91)  (1.6)  (0.06) (0.77) (0.62)  (0.68) 
Government  Effectiveness  0.163  0.022 0.216 -0.122  -0.178 -0.118 0.005  -0.054  -0.013  -0.033  0 
  (1.36)  (0.19)  (1.58)  (1.24)  (1.64) (0.68) (0.07)  (0.88)  (0.22)  (0.44)  (0) 
Population -0.094  -0.207  -0.283  -0.129  -0.149 -0.194 -0.07  -0.037  -0.039  -0.086  -0.103 
 (2.25)**  (5.29)***  (5.89)***  (3.77)***  (3.94)***  (3.02)***  (2.77)***  (1.77)*  (1.97)**  (3.36)***  (3.13)*** 
UN Voting similarity  2.421  0.274  -0.162  -0.612  -0.142  0.432           
 (4.10)***  (0.66)  (0.23)  (1.64)  (0.6)  (1.69)*           
Years of this donor’s colony  0.02  -0.013  0.172  -0.002  0.017  0.004           
 (8.30)***  (0.88)  (2.15)**  (0.23)  (8.27)***  (0.22)           
Years of other donor’s colony  -0.001  -0.003  -0.004  -0.001  0.001  -0.002           
  (0.81)  (2.41)**  (1.79)*  (0.84)  (0.56) (0.67)          
Constant  -0.402 2.889  3.97 2.311  1.858 2.948 1.105  0.483  0.516  1.116  1.376 
 (0.57) 
 
(5.18)*** (4.59)*** (4.69)***  (4.71)***  (4.83)***  (4.73)***  (2.51)**  (2.82)*** (4.74)***  (4.53)*** 
 98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98 
     0.57 
 
0.26  0.4  0.26  0.56  0.15 0.15  0.04  0.06 0.15 0.12 
P-value for the same 
coefficient across donor 
 [0.000]     
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Eleven equations in this table are jointly estimated by SUR. Each column number from (1) to (6) corresponds to the equation-by-equation estimation result reported 
in Table 8 with the same column number while each column number from (7) to (11) corresponds to the equation-by-equation estimation result reported in Table 6 
with the same column number.   
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Table 16: SUR estimation: Colonial past and political alliances for six bilateral donors plus political alliances for other five bilateral donors (1996-
1999) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 France  Germany  Japan  Netherlands UK  US  Canada Italy Finland  Norway Sweden 
                  
                  
Poverty Gap  0.078  0.016  0.103  0.045  -0.003 0.022  0.031 0.001  0.003 0.025  0.019 
 (3.12)***  (0.77)  (4.25)***  (2.42)**  (0.15)  (0.64) (2.12)**  (0.11)  (0.24)  (1.67)*  (1.02) 
Political Rights  -0.015  -0.016  -0.015  -0.027  -0.054 -0.047 -0.036  0.002  -0.012  -0.014 -0.017 
  (0.44) (0.49) (0.39)  (0.96) (1.75)* (0.91) (1.65)*  (0.13)  (0.67)  (0.62) (0.58) 
Government Effectiveness  0.167  0.04  0.218  -0.113  -0.177 -0.125 -0.008  -0.036  0.006 -0.034 0.033 
 (1.36)  (0.35)  (1.6)  (1.13)  (1.63)  (0.72) (0.1) (0.54)  (0.1) (0.43) (0.32) 
Population -0.093  -0.203  -0.283  -0.127  -0.149 -0.195 -0.073  -0.033  -0.035  -0.086 -0.097 
 (2.20)**  (5.15)***  (5.87)***  (3.71)***  (3.94)***  (3.03)*** (2.81)***  -1.54  (1.72)*  (3.27)*** (2.84)*** 
UN Voting similarity  2.473  0.503 -0.126  -0.504  -0.141 0.385  -0.146 0.212 0.241  -0.02  0.474 
 (3.77)***  (0.99)  (0.17)  (1.16)  (0.6)  (1.48) (0.44)  (0.65)  (0.81)  (0.05) (1) 
Years of this donor's colony 0.02  -0.013  0.171  -0.002  0.017  0.003           
 (8.31)***  (0.87)  (2.14)**  (0.21)  (8.44)***  (0.19)           
Years of other donor's colony-0.001  -0.003  -0.004  -0.001  0.001  -0.002           
  (0.82)  (2.41)**  (1.79)*  (0.87)  (0.61) (0.59)          
Constant -0.454  2.658  3.934  2.207  1.854 2.959 1.251  0.269  0.272  1.136 0.89 
 (0.6) 
 
(4.19)*** (4.48)***  (4.09)*** (4.73)***  (4.82)***  (3.10)*** (0.7)  (0.77)  (2.58)**  (1.55) 
Observations  98 98 98 98  98  98  98 98 98  98  98 
R-squared 0.57  0.25  0.4  0.25  0.56 0.15  0.16  0.03  0.06  0.15 0.11 
P-value for the same 
coefficient across donor
     [0.000]           
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Eleven equations in this table are jointly estimated by SUR. Each column number from (1) to (6) corresponds to the equation-by-equation estimation result reported 
in Table 8 with the same column number. The equation-by-equation estimation results for columns (7) to (11) in this table are available on request.  
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Table 17: SUR estimation, Basic specification, six major bilateral donors (2001-2004) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 France  Germany  Japan  Netherlands  UK  US 
            
            
Poverty Gap  0.075  0.034  0.096  0.058  0.077  0.006 
 (2.78)***  (1.49)  (4.26)***  (3.05)***  (3.50)***  (0.17) 
Political Rights  0.024  -0.003  0.009  -0.036  0.02  -0.039 
 (0.56)  (0.08)  (0.26)  (1.17)  (0.55)  (0.71) 
Government Effectiveness  0.209 0.1  0.169  -0.127 0.022  -0.424 
 (1.42)  (0.80)  (1.36)  (1.22)  (0.18)  (2.26)** 
Population -0.143  -0.183  -0.223  -0.116  -0.132  -0.229 
 (2.88)***  (4.34)***  (5.37)***  (3.33)***  (3.26)***  (3.64)*** 
Constant 2.063  2.712  3.001  1.737  1.684  3.47 
 (4.44)***  (6.86)***  (7.70)***  (5.31)***  (4.44)***  (5.87)*** 
# of Obs  98  98  98  98  98  98 
R-squared 0.14  0.19  0.33  0.24  0.21  0.19 
P-value for the same 
coefficient across donor     [0.171]       
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Six equations in this table are jointly estimated by SUR. Each column number corresponds to the equation-by-equation estimation result reported in 
Table 7 with the same column number.  
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Table 18: SUR estimation, Basic specification, 11 bilateral donors (2001-2004) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
 France  Germany  Japan  Netherlands UK US  Canada  Italy  Finland  Norway  Sweden 
             
             
Poverty  Gap  0.075 0.034 0.096 0.058 0.077 0.006 0.024 0.016 0.006 0.017 0.022 
  (2.78)***  (1.49) (4.26)***  (3.05)***  (3.50)***  (0.17) (1.89)*  (1.26) (0.70) (1.38) (1.25) 
Political  Rights  0.024  -0.003 0.009  -0.036 0.02  -0.039 -0.018 0.008  -0.007 0.002  -0.012 
  (0.56) (0.08) (0.26) (1.17) (0.55) (0.71) (0.89) (0.40) (0.50) (0.09) (0.44) 
Government  Effectiveness 0.209  0.1  0.169  -0.127 0.022  -0.424 -0.045 -0.042 0.039  -0.07  -0.023 
  (1.42) (0.80) (1.36) (1.22) (0.18) (2.26)**  (0.65) (0.62) (0.79) (1.04) (0.23) 
Population  -0.143 -0.183 -0.223 -0.116 -0.132 -0.229 -0.095 -0.045 -0.038 -0.064 -0.092 
  (2.88)*** (4.34)*** (5.37)*** (3.33)*** (3.26)*** (3.64)*** (4.11)*** (1.97)**  (2.33)**  (2.84)*** (2.81)*** 
Constant  2.063 2.712 3.001 1.737 1.684 3.47  1.28  0.577 0.502 0.827 1.264 
  (4.44)*** (6.86)*** (7.70)*** (5.31)*** (4.44)*** (5.87)*** (5.92)*** (2.71)*** (3.28)*** (3.92)*** (4.14)*** 
# of Obs  98  98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
R-squared 0.14  0.19 0.33 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.2 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.1 
P-value for the same 
coefficient across donor 
 [0.000]  
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Eleven equations in this table are jointly estimated by SUR. Each column number corresponds to the equation-by-equation estimation result reported 
in Table 7 with the same column number.  
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Table 19: SUR estimation, Colonial past and political alliances, six bilateral donors (2001-2004) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
 France  Germany  Japan  Netherlands  UK  US 
          
          
Poverty  Gap  0.043  0.049 0.063  0.062 0.044 0.001 
  (2.08)**  (1.97)** (2.63)***  (3.00)***  (2.16)** (0.02) 
Political  Rights  -0.012 0.025  -0.027 -0.032  -0.015  -0.034 
  (0.35)  (0.61) (0.70)  (0.95) (0.44) (0.59) 
Government  Effectiveness  0.129 0.151  0.083 -0.107  -0.095  -0.456 
  (1.16)  (1.14) (0.69)  (0.97) (0.86) (2.33)** 
Population  -0.14  -0.185 -0.268  -0.112 -0.062 -0.253 
  (3.69)*** (4.02)***  (6.09)*** (2.90)***  (1.63)  (3.61)*** 
UN Voting similarity  0.419  0.785  1.979  0.194  -0.005  -0.165 
  (0.84)  (1.52) (2.93)***  (0.44) (0.01) (0.49) 
Years of this donor's colony  0.019  -0.036  0.218  0.005  0.015  0.007 
  (7.39)*** (1.82)*  (2.93)*** (0.67)  (6.45)***  (0.34) 
Years of other donor's colony  -0.003  -0.002  -0.002  0.001  0.003  -0.002 
  (1.52) (0.82)  (0.84) (0.33)  (1.71)*  (0.54) 
Constant  1.711  2.122 1.688  1.515 0.826 3.76 
  (2.95)***  (3.24)*** (2.35)**  (2.76)*** (1.63)  (5.36)*** 
Observations  98 98 98 98  98  98 
R-squared  0.58  0.19 0.4 0.24 0.42 0.19 
P-value for the same 
coefficient across donor 
   [0.4]      
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Eleven equations in this table are jointly estimated by SUR. Each column number corresponds to the equation-by-equation estimation result reported in Table 9 
with the same column number.  
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Table 20: SUR estimation: Colonial past and political alliances for six bilateral donors plus basic specification for other five bilateral donors (2001-
2004) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
 France  Germany Japan  Netherlands UK  US  Canada Italy Finland  Norway Sweden 
                      
                      
Poverty  Gap  0.051 0.044 0.062 0.057  0.049  -0.003 0.024 0.016 0.006 0.017  0.022 
  (2.51)**  (1.81)* (2.61)***  (2.89)*** (2.41)** (0.08)  (1.89)* (1.26)  (0.70)  (1.38)  (1.25) 
Political  Rights  -0.004  0.019  -0.032  -0.036 -0.012  -0.03 -0.018  0.008  -0.007  0.002  -0.012 
 (0.11)  (0.47)  (0.84)  (1.11)  (0.38)  (0.52)  (0.89)  (0.40)  (0.50)  (0.09)  (0.44) 
Government  Effectiveness 0.161  0.127  0.085  -0.126  -0.08  -0.478  -0.045  -0.042  0.039  -0.07 -0.023 
 (1.47)  (0.97)  (0.70)  (1.17)  (0.74)  (2.45)**  (0.65)  (0.62)  (0.79)  (1.04)  (0.23) 
Population -0.133  -0.19  -0.263  -0.118  -0.07  -0.271 -0.095  -0.045  -0.038 -0.064  -0.092 
 (3.54)***  (4.25)***  (6.08)***  (3.19)***  (1.88)*  (3.92)***  (4.11)***  (1.97)**  (2.33)**  (2.84)***  (2.81)*** 
UN Voting similarity  0.672  0.48  2.119  -0.037  -0.045  -0.28           
 (1.49)  (1.14)  (3.46)***  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.90)           
Years of this donor's colony  0.018  -0.039  0.206  0.005  0.013  0.005           
 (7.48)***  (2.20)**  (3.00)***  (0.76)  (6.76)***  (0.27)           
Years of other donor's colony  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  0  0.003  -0.003           
 (1.16)  (1.15)  (0.64)  (0.19)  (2.05)**  (1.19)           
Constant 1.415  2.43  1.507  1.775  0.948  3.994  1.28  0.577  0.502  0.827  1.264 
  (2.60)***  (4.20)***  (2.25)**  (3.94)*** (2.07)** (5.84)***  (5.92)***  (2.71)***  (3.28)***  (3.92)*** (4.14)*** 
Observations 98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98 
R-squared  0.56  0.19  0.39 0.24  0.42 0.19  0.20  0.08  0.08 0.13  0.10 
P-value for the same 
coefficient across donor 
      [0.057]           
Six equations in this table are jointly estimated by SUR. Each column number from (1) to (6) corresponds to the equation-by-equation estimation result reported in 
Table 9 with the same column number while each column number from (7) to (11) corresponds to the equation-by-equation estimation result reported in Table 7 with 
the same column number. 
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Table 21: SUR estimation: Colonial past and political alliances for six bilateral donors plus political alliances for other five bilateral donors (2001-
2004) 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Eleven equations in this table are jointly estimated by SUR. Each column number from (1) to (6) corresponds to the equation-by-equation estimation result reported 
in Table 9 with the same column number. The equation-by-equation estimation results for columns (7) to (11) in this table are available on request. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
 France  Germany  Japan  Netherlands UK  US  Canada Italy Finland  Norway  Sweden 
                      
                      
Poverty Gap  0.047  0.048  0.06  0.061  0.048  -0.001  0.015  0.021  0.009  0.025  0.031 
 (2.27)**  (1.95)*  (2.52)**  (2.98)***  (2.37)**  (0.03)  (1.13)  (1.55)  (0.99)  (1.96)*  (1.69)* 
Political Rights  -0.011  0.025  -0.034  -0.031  -0.013  -0.027  -0.031  0.015  -0.002  0.014  0.003 
 (0.31)  (0.62)  (0.88)  (0.93)  (0.39)  (0.47)  (1.49)  (0.73)  (0.16)  (0.69)  (0.08) 
Government Effectiveness  0.139  0.147  0.082  -0.11  -0.081  -0.463  -0.084  -0.019  0.053  -0.031  0.023 
 (1.26)  (1.11)  (0.68)  (1.00)  (0.74)  (2.37)**  (1.19)  (0.27)  (1.04)  (0.45)  (0.23) 
Population -0.136  -0.186  -0.264  -0.116  -0.07  -0.266 -0.102  -0.041  -0.036 -0.057  -0.083 
 (3.63)***  (4.16)***  (6.11)*** (3.10)***  (1.88)*  (3.84)***  (4.43)***  (1.76)*  (2.15)**  (2.52)**  (2.53)** 
UN Voting similarity  0.353  0.738  2.218  0.18  -0.064  -0.167  -0.586  0.333  0.211  0.515  0.76 
 (0.71)  (1.46)  (3.45)*** (0.42)  (0.17)  (0.51)  (1.86)*  (1.05)  (0.92)  (1.88)*  (1.51) 
Years of this donor's colony  0.018  -0.039  0.209  0.005  0.013  0.006           
 (7.52)***  (2.18)**  (3.03)*** (0.76)  (6.76)***  (0.34)           
Years of other donor's colony  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  0  0.003  -0.003           
 (1.14)  (1.15)  (0.67)  (0.18)  (2.07)**  (1.17)           
Constant 1.712  2.183  1.431  1.568  0.963  3.924  1.847  0.252  0.297  0.331  0.527 
 (2.97)***  (3.42)***  (2.08)**  (2.94)***  (1.96)*  (5.71)***  (4.98)***  (0.67)  (1.10)  (0.98)  (0.92) 
Observations 98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98  98 
R-squared 0.57  0.19  0.39  0.24  0.42 
 
0.19 0.24  0.08 0.09  0.15 0.12 
P-value for the same 
coefficient across donor 
     [0.043]          
 